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Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Health Law
Phil Zarone'and Ian Donaldson2
Health Law - Confidentiality of National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) reports; Peer Review Privilege. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that documents contained in a physician's cre-
dentials file were immune from discovery under the federal Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) and the Pennsylvania
Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA).
Troescher v. Grody, 869 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
Elizabeth Troescher and her husband sued Dr. Marvin Grody
for medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent.3
Troescher also sued Temple University Health System (TUHS)
and several of its affiliates, alleging that they were liable for dam-
ages under the doctrine of corporate negligence for allowing a "sub
par" surgeon to perform her operation.4 Troescher sought Dr.
Grody's credentials file, but Grody and TUHS claimed the docu-
ments were privileged under the federal Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act (HCQIA)5 and the Pennsylvania Peer Review Pro-
tection Act (PRPA).6
The trial court ordered Grody and TUHS to disclose certain
documents from Dr. Grody's credentials file, some of which were
1. Partner, Horty, Springer & Mattern, P.C.; J.D. (cum laude), University of Pitts-
burgh (1998); M.A., Ohio State University (1994); B.A. (summa cum laude, Phi Beta
Kappa), University of Pittsburgh (1989).
2. Associate, Horty, Springer & Mattern, P.C.; J.D., University of Pittsburgh (2006);
B.A., Pennsylvania State University (1999).
3. Troescher v. Grody, 869 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
4. Troescher, 869 A.2d at 1016, 1025.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11145. HCQIA was established to restrict the ability of incom-
petent physicians to move state to state without disclosure of their previous performance by
providing protection for physicians engaging in professional peer review activities.
6. 63 P.S. §§ 425.1-425.4. PRPA provides immunity to individuals who participate in
peer review activities, and provides for confidentiality for certain documents used in an
organization's peer review activities.
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created by the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)7 and
some of which were generated by TUHS and its medical staff to be
used in the hospital's credentialing process.8 Grody and TUHS
appealed, arguing that the documents created by the NPDB were
confidential under HCQIA and that the credentialing documents
were confidential under the PRPA.9
Based on a "plain reading" of the confidentiality provisions of
HCQIA and the NPDB regulations, the superior court held that
the documents obtained from the NPDB and maintained in
Dr. Grody's credentials file were confidential and immune from
discovery." The court rejected Troescher's argument that the dis-
covery rules in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure author-
ized her to obtain the NPDB reports, noting that the rules apply
only to information that is "not privileged."1"
The superior court also held that Dr. Grody's credentialing files
were privileged under the PRPA. 2 The superior court noted that
the PRPA was promulgated to maintain high professional stan-
dards and recognized that medical professionals are in the best
position to police their own activities. 3 Accordingly, the PRPA
provides confidentiality for the proceedings and records of peer
review committees.
4
Troescher argued that some of the credentialing documents
were discoverable because their authors sent a copy to the peer
review committee but kept the original for themselves." The court
rejected this interpretation of the "original source" exception in
the PRPA, finding that "[t]he proviso does not turn on whether a
document itself is technically the 'original' or merely a 'copy."6
Rather, it turns on whether the documents are available from an
'original source,' other than the review organization itself."7 The
superior court also rejected Troescher's argument that the PRPA
only shields documents created by a review committee, and not by
7. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.01-60.14. The NPDB is a by-product of HCQIA created to col-
lect and release certain information relating to the professional competence and conduct of
physicians and other health practitioners.
8. Troescher, 869 A.2d at 1017, 1019-20.
9. Id. at 1018.
10. Id. at 1019-20.
11. Id. at 1020.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1020-21.
14. Troescher, 869 A.2d at 1021.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1022.
17. Id.
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an individual, finding that "review organization," as used in the
PRPA confidentiality provision, refers to both an entity and an
individual involved in peer review."
Troescher is significant because it resolves an ambiguity in the
PRPA. The PRPA states that the proceedings and records of a
"review committee" are shielded from discovery,19 but does not de-
fine the term "review committee." Instead, it defines the term "re-
view organization."2' The plaintiffs in Troescher attempted to take
advantage of this ambiguity by arguing that the PRPA applies
only to review committees, and thus does not shield documents
created by individuals.21 The court rejected this argument, finding
that
for all practical purposes, the Legislature uses the terms
"committee" and "individual" interchangeably. In our
view, drawing a distinction between multi-person com-
mittees and single individuals would be a distracting and
meaningless exercise. It would also subvert the plain and
overriding intent of the Legislature to protect peer review
records.22
Health Law - Corporate Negligence - The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that a patient was able to establish a prima fa-
cie case of corporate negligence against a hospital.
Brodowski v. Ryave, 2005 WL 2680426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
In June 1995, Tammy Brodowski presented to Montgomery
Hospital's emergency room complaining of numbness and partial
paralysis to the right side of her body.' The emergency room phy-
sician identified stroke and "conversion reaction disorder," a psy-
chiatric disorder, as potential causes of Brodowski's symptoms,
and ordered that various tests be conducted. 24 Although these ini-
tial tests came back negative, the emergency room physician in-
tended for Brodowski to be admitted to the hospital's medical (as
18. Id.
19. 63 P.S. § 425.4.
20. 63 P.S. § 425.2.
21. Troescher, 869 A.2d at 1022.
22. Id.
23. Brodowski v. Ryave, 885 A.2d 1045 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
24. Brosdowski, 855 A.2d at 1050.
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opposed to psychiatric) unit. 5 However, after the emergency room
physician completed his shift, an unknown individual had Bro-
dowski admitted to the hospital's psychiatric department before a
neurological consultation had been obtained and medical causes of
her symptoms had been ruled out.26
After three hours, Brodowski checked herself out of the psychi-
atric unit.27 Later that night, she was taken to Suburban Hospital
with the same complaint of right-side weakness. 8 Physicians at
Suburban also recommended that she undergo psychiatric evalua-
tion and later discharged her to a local psychiatric facility.29 While
at the psychiatric facility, Brodowski began to suffer facial weak-
ness and speech difficulties, and an MRI revealed evidence of in-
farcted brain tissue resulting from a stroke."
In May 1996, Brodowski filed a complaint alleging that Mont-
gomery Hospital was liable for corporate negligence because,
among other things, no neurological consultation had been con-
ducted and inadequate shift-change and record-keeping proce-
dures had caused her to be admitted to the psychiatric unit rather
than the medical unit.3 Prior to trial, the court granted the hospi-
tal's motion in limine to dismiss the corporate negligence claims,
apparently agreeing with the hospital that Brodowski's expert had
provided no testimony to support a claim of corporate negligence.32
Brodowski appealed.33
The Pennsylvania Superior Court began by noting that Thomp-
son v. Nason Hospital established that a hospital can be found
directly liable for corporate negligence if it fails any of the follow-
ing four duties: (1) a duty to use reasonable care in the mainte-
nance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to
select and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee
all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient
care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules
25. Id. at 1051.
26. Id. at 1050-52. An expert at trial described conversion reaction disorder as a psy-
chiatric diagnosis 'where a person has a sudden onset of either a motor symptom, their arm
doesn't move, or they're weak on one side... and they are usually either suddenly numb on
one whole side of their body or numb from their foot up....
27. Id. at 1052.
28. Id. at 1052-53.
29. Brodowski, 885 A.2d at 1053.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1053-54.
33. Id. at 1054.
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and policies to ensure quality care for patients.' A corporate neg-
ligence claim is based on the negligent acts of the institution itself,
and it does not require the negligence of a doctor or other third-
party to establish a cause of action. 5
On appeal, Montgomery Hospital argued that Brodowski's ex-
pert had only provided testimony that individual physicians had
acted negligently, and had not provided evidence of negligence on
the part of the hospital itself.3 6 Brodowski countered that the ex-
pert's testimony supported her claims that the hospital had failed
to enforce its rules and policies and had failed "to oversee and su-
pervise its physicians with respect to triage of patients from the
emergency room to hospital admission, and transfer of patients at
shift changes. "37
The superior court agreed with Brodowski, noting:
What occurred at Montgomery could be described as a
chain of missteps whereby each physician who examined
Plaintiff recognized a differential diagnosis of [stroke]
versus conversion reaction disorder and, still, through an
unknown individual . . . Plaintiff was admitted to the
psychiatric unit with an outstanding physical diagnosis of
[stroke] and no neurology consult. [Two hospital repre-
sentatives] agreed that physical causes for symptoms
would have to first be ruled out before admission to the
psychiatric unit. Yet, this did not occur, thereby provid-
ing Plaintiff with evidence of Montgomery's failure to
38oversee or supervise.
Brodowski is significant because it makes clear that hospitals
must do more than merely adopt policies to promote quality care
for patients. 9 Hospitals can be liable if they fail to ensure that
physicians comply with such policies.4 ° Furthermore, the opinion
puts hospitals on notice that the corporate negligence doctrine, as
defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Thompson, is
alive and well.
34. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 199 1).
35. Brodowski, 885 A.2d at 1056.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1058-59.
38. Id. at 1059.




Health Law - Medical Monitoring - The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the members of a class of patients who alleged
they were intentionally misled by a hospital issuing Pap smear re-
ports failed to state a viable cause of action for medical monitoring.
Walter v. Magee Womens Hospital, 876 A.2d 400 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005).
Female patients brought a class action lawsuit against Magee-
Womens Hospital on behalf of a proposed class of women whose
Pap smears were processed from 1995 to the present.4' The class
alleged that Magee intentionally deceived its patients by issuing
computer-generated Pap smear reports that were reviewed by cy-
totechnologists 42 but were affixed with a reproduced signature or
attestation of a pathologist.43 The class claimed that the hospital
caused them harm by allowing cancer and other serious conditions
to go undetected as a result of tests that may have been read in-
correctly. The class sought damages in the form of the cost of the
medical monitoring of their conditions to assure that any previous
errors were identified and appropriate follow-up care was re-
ceived.44 In January 2004, Magee filed objections to the complaint,
arguing that the patients bringing the class action suit lacked
standing to maintain a cause of action and that they failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.45 The trial court dis-
missed the patients' complaint with prejudice, finding that they
failed to demonstrate that they suffered any legally cognizable
injury other than the "fear of being at an increased rate of having
a serious medical injury. "
41. Walter v. Magee Womens Hosp. of UPMC Health Sys., 876 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005), affd 906 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2006) (per curium order). The case was one in a series of
lawsuits brought against the hospital in relation to its practice of allowing Pap smear re-
ports to be reviewed by cytotechnologists, instead of doctors. The other lawsuits included
that of two former Magee pathologists who claimed Magee was deceptively affixing physi-
cians' signatures to its Pap smear reports, and another by a patient who alleged the hospi-
tal's laboratory failed to identify her cervical cancer because her Pap smear reports were
inadequately reviewed. See Steve Twedt, Woman Sues Over Pap Smear Test She Claims
False Results Caused Complications, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 2004, at B12.
42. Cytotechnologists are certified clinical laboratory technologists who specialize in
the examination of cells. Vergil Slee, M.D., et al., Slee's Health Care Terms, 124 (4th ed.
2001).
43. Walter, 876 A.2d at 402.
44. Id. at 403.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 404.
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The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that for plaintiffs to
prevail on a medical monitoring claim, they must prove that they
were exposed to greater than normal background levels of a
proven hazardous substance, that this exposure was caused by the
defendant's negligence, and that the exposure was the proximate
cause of a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious, la-
tent disease.47 The patients claimed that their exposure to unsafe
and dangerous medical care in the form of "inherently unreliable"
testing was equivalent to exposure to a hazardous substance. The
superior court rejected this analogy, stating, "[Tihere was no expo-
sure or event caused by the Defendant's negligence that resulted
in a significantly greater risk that Plaintiffs will suffer from a se-
rious medical condition."4' Furthermore, the court held that the
patients suffered no greater increased risk of cancer by Magee's
actions, and that there was no allegation that any of the class
members actually had any condition that would have been de-
tected if a physician would have reviewed their Pap smear re-
ports.49 Therefore, the superior court affirmed the trial court's de-
cision to dismiss the patients' claim with prejudice. ° On Decem-
ber 13, 2005, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed to hear
an appeal on whether the superior court erred in finding that the
patients failed to state a cause of action and whether the class of
patients suffered legal injury sufficient to confer standing.51
Walter is significant because it demonstrates the superior
court's reluctance to extend the cause of action for medical moni-
toring claims as plaintiffs had requested. Regardless of how this
case is ultimately decided, it will most likely fuel the ongoing de-
bate over malpractice liability and insurance costs.
52
47. Id. at 405.
48. Id.
49. Walter, 876 A.2d at 405.
50. Id. at 406.
51. Walter v. Magee Womens Hosp. of UPMC Health Sys., 889 A.2d 43 (Pa. 2005) (order
granting appeal on these two issues). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, per
curium, the superior court's opinion. Walter v. Magee Womens Hosp. of UPMC Health Sys.,
906 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2006).
52. In a related action, the hospital was cited in October 2005 by the Department of
Health for allowing unauthorized staff to sign Pap smear reports and for not maintaining
quality assessment records. See Steve Twedt, Glitch in Magee-Womens' Computer System
Caused Pap Smear Errors, State Says, Prrr. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 2005, at B5. A spokes-
man for the department stated that the department believed the error was due to a glitch




Health Law - Peer Review Protection Act - The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that quality management reports generated and
used exclusively by a hospital for peer review purposes were privi-
leged from discovery under the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protec-
tion Act (PRPA).
Dodson v. Deleo, 872 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
In April 2001, Verna Dodson underwent a vertical banded gas-
troplasty that was performed by Dr. Joanna DeLeo.53 Dodson
brought a professional negligence claim against Dr. DeLeo and
Pinnacle Health Hospital, alleging the procedure and subsequent
post-operative care were below the standard of care."
Dodson filed a Motion to Compel Answers and Production of
Documents.55 Specifically, Dodson sought several "Department of
Surgery Quality Management Credentialing Report[s." 8 The re-
ports in question were "specific to Dr. DeLeo, and detail[ed] all of
Dr. DeLeo's cases which were reviewed by the Quality Assurance
Committee during the [applicable] calendar year, as well as any
action taken by the Quality Assurance Committee."57 The reports
were generated by the Performance Improvement Department. 5
As the court noted, "[tihe documents chart problems and potential
problems with the doctor's performance. Each of these problems
and potential problems is rated on a scale of one to five, with one
indicating "No Problem" and five indicating "Deviation in patient
management and adverse effects."59
DeLeo and Pinnacle asserted that the documents were protected
from discovery under the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection
Act (PRPA). ° The PRPA provides immunity to individuals who
participate in peer review activities and a privilege from discovery
for documents used in an organization's peer review activities.61
The trial court granted Dodson's Motion to Compel Documents
in part, finding that the documents were "merely raw data" that
had been compiled and then submitted to a peer review commit-
53. Dodson v. DeLeo, 872 A.2d 1237, 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
54. Id. at 1239.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1240.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1240-41.
59. Dodson, 872 A.2d at 1243.
60. Id.
61. 63 P.S. §§ 425.1-425.4.
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tee.6" DeLeo and Pinnacle appealed, arguing that the documents
were used exclusively for purposes of physician credentialing and
were protected under the PRPA.'
The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the PRPA was en-
acted to facilitate the self-policing of health care providers.'
Therefore, the legitimate records of a peer review committee are
privileged under the PRPA.65 However, general business records
are not privileged and do not become privileged merely because
they are reviewed by a peer review committee.66
The superior court held that the documents were both created
and used exclusively by the hospital for peer review purposes and
were therefore privileged under the PRPA.67 A review of the
documents showed that they recorded information related to a
physician's performance, which was clearly related to peer review
activities.68 Furthermore, the superior court held that the docu-
ments did not lose their privileged status simply because some of
the information contained therein was available from other non-
privileged sources.69
Dodson sheds light on the extent to which information will be
viewed as part of the peer review process, and thus protected from
discovery, or instead be viewed as a "business record" that is not
protected from discovery. It also makes clear that information
generated by a peer review committee is not discoverable simply
because some of that information is available from other sources.
62. Dodson, 872 A.2d at 1243.
63. Id. at 1240. The documents in question were created by the hospital's Performance
Improvement Department and were used exclusively within the physician's credentialing
file for purposes of quality assurance.
64. Id. at 1242.
65. Id. at 1243.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dodson, 872 A.2d at 1243.
69. Id. at 1244.
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Health Law - Hospital Billing and the Uninsured - The United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dis-
missed complaints brought by uninsured patients against two
Pennsylvania hospitals.
Feliciano v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 2005 WL
2397047 (E.D. Pa. 2005), and Hutt v. Albert Einstein Medical
Center, 2005 WL 2396313 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
In 2004, Mississippi tobacco litigator, Richard Scruggs, organ-
ized the filing of lawsuits against hundreds of nonprofit hospitals
on behalf of uninsured patients in federal courts.7 ° In 2005, most
of these actions were dismissed, including complaints brought
against two hospitals in Pennsylvania.71
In these cases,72 the uninsured patients alleged that the non-
profit hospitals, as tax-exempt charitable entities under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, had an express or implied contract with the
United States government and the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania to provide affordable medical care to all patients. 7' Based on
these allegations, the uninsured patients asserted two primary
claims: (1) they suffered harm as a third-party beneficiary to a
government contract, and (2) the hospitals were in breach of a
public charitable trust.
74
Under the third-party beneficiary claim, the uninsured patients
first argued that the hospitals agreed to meet a number of specific
obligations, including providing charity care, in exchange for re-
ceiving tax-exempt status.75 The uninsured patients, who alleged
that they were charged excessive medical fees and were subject to
"humiliating" debt collection tactics, claimed that they did not re-
ceive the intended benefits of this agreement due to the hospitals'
70. Jonathan Cohn, Uncharitable?, N.Y. TIMES, January 19, 2004, at 51.
71. In addition, a third "copy cat" suit, that was not affiliated with the Scruggs-led
litigation, was dismissed earlier in the year. Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752 (W.D.
Pa. 2005). This suit was brought against the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
(UPMC) by a Pittsburgh personal injury attorney and claimed that the medical center
violated its tax-exempt status by charging uninsured patients "full sticker price" in the
emergency room. Torsten Ove, UPMC Sued Over Billings, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 15,
2004, at As.
72. The similarities of the complaints and the corresponding slip opinions issued by the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allow the cases to be
addressed in tandem.
73. Feliciano v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 2005 WL 2397047, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
74. Feliciano, 2005 WL 2397074, at *1.
75. Id. at *2.
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breach. 6 However, the district court dismissed the claim, finding
that the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) did not create a private
cause of action without the intervention of the Secretary of the
Treasury or the United States Attorney General. 7' Furthermore,
the court found that even if such an action could be brought, the
IRC did not create a contract between the government and the
hospitals." Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the district
court stated:
[Aibsent some clear indication that the legislature in-
tends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that
a law is not intended to create private contractual or
vested rights . . . the language of IRC 501 does not indi-
cate that Congress intended to create contractual rights
for United States citizens.79
The uninsured patients also argued that the hospitals created a
public charitable trust to provide mutually affordable medical care
to uninsured patients by accepting tax exemption, and that their
actions breached their trust obligations. ° The court again held
that the IRC did not create a private cause of action.8 Further-
more, under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court held
that a party must manifest an intent to form a charitable trust.82
Here, the uninsured patients showed no intent on the part of the
hospitals.8" Therefore, because there was no legal basis for the
existence of a contract under 501(c)(3), and because there was no
breach of a public charitable trust, the district court dismissed the
two complaints.84
Like the complaints filed in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, most of the suits filed on behalf of the uninsured in other
jurisdictions have also been dismissed.85 Nevertheless, despite
these failures, the Scruggs-led litigation has pushed on at the
76. Id.
77. Id. at *3.
78. Id.
79. Feliciano, 2005 WL 2397047, at *3.
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Feliciano, 2005 WL 2397047, at *7.
85. Paul Barr, Changing Venues: Scruggs' Billing Lawsuit Moves to State Courts,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 14, 2005, at 14.
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state level with hopes for greater success.86 As of November 2005,
lawyers for class-action plaintiffs had filed over 60 state lawsuits,
with one hospital in Oregon choosing to enter a settlement agree-
ment.87
Regardless of their success, this series of lawsuits has pushed
the issue of hospital billing practices to the forefront of media cov-
erage and may also serve as a signal to hospitals that they could
expect closer scrutiny as the number of uninsured Americans con-
tinues to grow.
86. Id. (stating that "[tihe change in strategy follows about a dozen dismissals of the
more than 50 suits filed in federal courts by the Scruggs consortium. .. ").
87. Laura B. Benko, The First of Many? Ore. System Settles Scruggs' Charity-Care
Lawsuit, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 7, 2005, at 14. Providence Health System agreed to a
settlement with a Scruggs'-affiliated Seattle law firm after deciding it would be costlier to
litigate the matter than to settle. However, the article also notes that a similar settlement
for $150 million with North Mississippi Health Services, Tupelo, Mississippi, which was
proposed in federal court, "unraveled" in April 2005.
470 Vol. 44
